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DECENTRALIZATIONS EFFECT TO INDONESIA FOREST
Illegal Logging Practice
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Yolamalinda1
Abstrak
Desentralisasi yang dilaksanakan di Indonesia sejak tahun 1998 menyebabkan kenaikan angka
illegal logging pada hutan Indonesia. Illegal logging tidak hanya menyebabkan kerugian pada
lingkungan tapi juga pada kegiatan ekonomi. Indonesia sebagai negara dengan hutan terbesar
ketiga di dunia, sebagian besar pendapatan penduduknya bertopang pada hasil hutan kayu dan
non-kayu. Kegiatan illegal logging akan memberikan kerugian ekonomi pada pemerintah dan
juga masyarakat sekitarnya. Illegal logging di era desentralisasi salah satu penyebabnya adalah
peraturan yang tumpang tindih. Peraturan menyebabkan meningkatnya biaya produksi terutama
biaya tetap.
Kata kunci: illegal logging, desentralisasi, peraturan pemerintah
INTRODUCTION
Decentralisation is a transferring considerable degree of administrative and regulatory
authority from the national government to the country’s province and district government. This
process has been occurred in Indonesia since 1998. Decentralisation has been driven by the
demands of provincial and district government who has rich jurisdiction. They are complained
that the vast majority of the benefits go to the national government and to private sector. The
legislation of the transferring are the law 22 on regional governance, law 25 on fiscal balancing,
and the specific decentralisation, law 41 of 1999 about Indonesia’s basic forestry law.
The manner in which decentralization affects forest management, community livelihoods,
and economic development is a particular significance in Indonesia due to the scale and
importance of the country’s forest resources. Indonesia has the world’s third largest tract of
tropical forest, after Brazil and Congo. In 1997, the country’s total forest cover was officially
estimated by 100 millions hectares (the state of forest Indonesia). About 20 million Indonesian
people, their live depends to the forest and the non-timber forest product. Timber gives very big
revenue for the state. People used the timber for the paper industry. As the data provide by the
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State of Indonesian Forest tells that about in 1997 about 3,9 % of the GDP is from the timber, or
almost a half from the value of oil and gas export, and equal to 10 % export earning.
Over the century ago Indonesia forest cover by 170 million hectares, today 98 million ha.
It means that almost a half of Indonesian forest being degradated. Indonesia lost its 17 % forest
by 1985 - 1997 with average 1 million ha per year. Over that time is a Soeharto`s regime. Much
of the policies at that time give permission to exploit the large size of the forest. Most of the
timber company belongs to the Soeharto families and his cronies. FAO study found there has
been a marked increase in the extent and rate of Indonesia forest cover. At 1990, FAO study
found that Indonesia forest cover has been reduced from 74% until 56% in the space years 30–40
years. It is conclude that the lost of Indonesia forest cover is because of the growth of timber
industry. Another source provides the data that shown the linkages between the lost of Indonesia
forest cover with the growth of population density.
Before the country’s entered the decentralization process, in late 1998, Indonesia’s
forestry sector had entered a period of crisis. From the mid 1980, deforestation estimated by 1.6
million hectares per year.  As we mentioned above that deforestation driving by the overcapacity
in the nation’s wood processing industries. At the mid 1990s, Indonesia sawn wood, plywood,
and pulp industries are estimated to have consumed 60-80 million cubic meters of wood per year.
With few effective legal structures in Indonesia’s forestry sector, domestic demand for timber
has resulted in large volumes of wood domestic demand for timber has resulted in large volumes
of wood being harvested from illegal sources.
Illegal logging can be defined as the harvesting of logs in contravention of laws and
regulations. These laws and regulations were designed to prevent the over exploitation of forest
resources and to promote sustainable forest management. In accordance to this definition, illegal
may include logging activities in protected area, the logging of protected species, logging outside
concession boundaries, extraction of more than allowable harvest, removal of oversized or
undersized trees, and harvesting in areas where extraction is prohibited such as catchments areas,
step slopes and river banks. In the current era of economic and political change in Indonesia,
illegal logging may also refer to an array of extractive activities that have some degrees of legal
recognition, primarily as small-scale concession allowable under the current decentralization
laws, or as logging practice legitimize through district regulations. In accordance to the last
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definition, some logging activities may be considered to be “illegal” by the central government,
but “legal” according to some district governments. The distinction between “illegal” and “legal”
is therefore blurred making it extremely difficult to define either activity.
Table 1. Forest Area and Deforestation, 1985-1997 (GFW Estimates)
Source: The State of the Forest; Indonesia, 2002
The state of the Forests: Indonesia, noted that illegal logging as an emotive term that
requires some definition. It uses the terms of forestry practices or activities connected with wood
harvesting, processing, and trade that do not conform to Indonesian law. There are essentially
two kinds of illegal logging. The first is carried out by legitimate operators who violate the terms
of their licenses. The second involves outright timber theft, whereby trees are felled by people
who have no legal right to cut trees at all.
Data collection and analysis by the Natural Resource Management (NRM) Program of
USAID focused on the wood intake and production of Indonesia’s sawmills and plywood plants.
One conclusion was that any discussion of industry overcapacity and the link to illegal logging
must recognize that “illegal logging” can take many forms beyond the illegal removal of trees
from the forest. Examples can be found in the forest concession (HPH) system and the industrial
plantation (HTI) system.
1985 1997
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Land Area
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Forest cover
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% Land
area
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Forest
Cover
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as %
Land
Area
Forest
Change
1985-1997
(Ha)
Forest
Change
(%)
Sumatera 47,581,650 22,938,825 48 47,574,550 16,430,300 35 -6,508,525 -28
Java 13,319,975 1,274,600 10 13,315,550 1,869,645 14 595,075 47
Bali 563,750 96,450 17 563,150 76,700 14 -19,750 -20
Nusa
Tenggara 6,645,625 686,775 10 6,639,925 450,450 7 -236,325 -34
East Timor 1,498,500 374,400 25 1,497,525 9,850 1 -364,550 -97
Kalimantan 53,721,675 39,644,025 74 53,721,225 29,637,475 55 -10,006,550 -25
Sulawesi 18,757,575 11,192,725 60 18,753,025 7,950,900 42 -3,242,050 -29
Maluku 7,848,175 5,790,800 74 7,846,600 5,820,975 74 30,175 1
Irian jaya 41,405,500 35,192,725 85 41,403,850 33,382,475 81 -1,810,250 -5
Total 191,342,425 117,191,325 61 191,315,400 95,628,770 50 -21,562,750 -18
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL LOGGING TO THE ECONOMIC
Decentralization and regional autonomy allowed district government to take benefit from
natural resources, especially forest. For that need, the district government has to make their own
rules to regulate the system of forest exploitation. But the problems in doing this is the capability
of the institution still low. The officer has low education level that needs some roles from central
government to increase their capacity building.
There is some approach which district government attempt to increase their revenue is by
generating a new investment. In Kalimantan, district government generating new investment by
giving some concession to the log firm. This concession we called with IPPK (Timber extraction
and Utilization Permits), which the logging company has to pay some taxes to the district
government. But the problem rose by doing this project is many logging company do their
activities not in line with the area agreed at the concession. This practice caused the
overexploitation to the forest. The data shows, at the era where the concession gives by the
district government to the logging company, the area of forest cover increase. The failure on this
program emerges due to the weaknesses of district institution to manage the forest.  They
supposed to take some monitoring activity to control the program performance.
According to the article wrote by William D. Sunderlin and Ida Aju Pradnja
Resosudarmo, some concessionaries fail to manage their site appropriately, and have no view to
long term investment, due to:
1. The method of the concession allocation gives too much land to concessionaries. Certain
concessionaries thus have low incentives to prevent encroachment by small-holders, or
are unable to stop such encroachments. The timber royalty fees in Indonesia are based
largely on the volume of extraction rather than on the area of concessions, thus abetting
the tendency to have overly large concession areas.
2. Certain policies encourage rent-seeking behaviour and thus undermine incentives for
long-term management. The rate of royalty payment to the government is low, meaning
that concessionaries are able to capture a large share of the potential rent of concession.
William noted that based to Thiele, “high potential excess profits encourage ‘rent
seeking’ activities in acquiring concession and open the way for corruption so that the
enforcement of concession agreement is endangered.
Economica, Jurnal Program Studi Pendidikan Ekonomi STKIP PGRI Sumatera Barat Vol. 1 No. 2, April 2013 87
3. There is insufficient support for provincial level protection of forests. Provincial-level
governments receive a low share of royalty fees collected by the national government
which, as explained above, are already quite low. The World Bank explains that
“governments in provinces with extensive forest cover may be encouraged to replace
forest with other forms of land use more able to generate revenue at the provincial, or at
least provide more income opportunities to communities living near the forests whose
income might otherwise become a burden on provincial resources”.
Illegal logging gives a very big impact to the economics, for example in Kota Waringin
Timur and district of Bureau in Kalimantan. New initiatives arising since the fall of Suharto and
an attempt to decentralize power to the district governments, have allowed district government to
take benefit from the informal timber sector. This is most obvious in this district where the local
government generated a considerable amount of revenue by taxing “illegal” carriers of timber. In
the three months of April, May, June 2000, the regent was able to generate approximately
US$2,5 million by taxing illegal carriers of timber coming out of Kotawaringin Timur. In Berau,
the district government has been able to generate a comparatively small amount of US$444,000
from IPPK concession holders due to the fact that the imposed tax rate was far lower than the
rate imposed in Kotawaringin Timur. But while less income was generated, the US$444,000
accounted for 50% of Bureau’s gross domestic product (PAD), generated within the district in
the year 2000. Small concessions holders have also been able to generate a great deal of informal
income through the initial IPPK application process (US$125,000) and from issuing SKSHH
letters to sawmill (US$55,000).
But while both district governments are undoubtedly benefiting from the legalization of
“illegal” logging, the current rate of exploitation is far from sustainable. This means that these
local governments will only be able to pay benefit financially from timber exploitation, both
“illegal” and “legal”, for the next five to ten years. They will then have to find other ways to
generate district income. In both of the districts discussed in this paper, local government is
hoping to convert forest land to oil palm once it has been logged to ensure that there is an
established revenue generating industry once production forest have been depleted. They are
therefore making efforts to attract investors to the area in the hope that oil palm will provide a
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key revenue source after the region’s national capital has been depleted. While the political and
economic situation in Indonesia remains unstable, however, investors have been reluctant to
establish oil palm plantations in remote areas such as Kotawaringin Timur and Berau. World oil
palm prices also significantly declined in recent years making the oil palm sectors less attractive
to investors. It is therefore unlikely that a viable oil palm industry will be established in these
two districts before timber resources become depleted.
Moreover, at the national level, “illegal” logging is thought to be costing the national
government US$2,0 billion per annum, without considering losses in terms of ecological costs.
Some estimates place the total annual loss to the country from “illegal” logging over 1980-1985.
While some of this revenue is now going to local people and district governments, it seems likely
that the great majority is continuing to fall into the hands of privileged and well-connected elite.
This situation undermines national government efforts to implement effective law enforcement
and to promote sustainable forest management. It also undermines national government efforts to
maintain control over district government decisions to generate tax from “illegal” logging
activities.
THE GAP BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Illegal logging happened in Indonesia has become a general secret that it supported by the
civilian and military officials. Illegal timber brokers flourish throughout the country, supplying
wood processors who cannot obtain adequate supplies legally. Official involvement in illegal
logging has become so blatant and widespread that provincial legislators in Sumatera’s, Jambi
province felt obliged to make a public appeal to military, police, and justice officials to stop
supporting illegal loggers operations. The Indonesia Plywood Association (Apkindo) complained
in June 2000 that illegal loggers in Sumatera and Kalimantan were exporting at least 1 million
m3 of timber to China and undercutting the legal export markets.
The situation happened because of Indonesia has pursued a policy of aggressive
expansion in the forest products sector with insufficient regard for the long term sustainability of
supply. Indonesia’s annual log production rose from about 11 million m3 in the 1970s to a peak
of about 36 million m3 in the early 1990s. More rapid expansion occurred in the processed wood
products sector as the government encouraged a shift away from the production of lower value
Economica, Jurnal Program Studi Pendidikan Ekonomi STKIP PGRI Sumatera Barat Vol. 1 No. 2, April 2013 89
unprocessed logs toward value added products. The first boom was in plywood production,
which took off during the 1980s and 1990s as part of the country’s drive to increase exports.
Production has declined at the economic crisis of 1997, although startling data discrepancies
exist among different sources.
The pulp and paper industries have grown even more dramatically. Since the late 1980s,
production capacity has increased nearly 700 percent. Indonesia has become the world’s ninth
largest pulp producer and eleventh largest paper producer. This prodigious investment in
plywood, pulp and paper processing capacity has far outpaced efforts to develop adequate
feedstock for plantations and the industry expansion has come largely at the expense of the
country’s natural forests.
Table 2. Estimated “Legal” and “Illegal” Log Production in East Kalimantan, 2000
Industry
Official, log legal production illegal log production Estimated real production
Total
unit
(HPH)
official
production
(m3/year) Total unit(camps)
illegal production
(m3/year)
unit Production(m3/year)
Berau 8 798,000 180 160,000 194 958,000
Malinau 10 422,540 31 17,000 41 439,540
Pasir 3 74,578 114 94,000 117 168,578
Total 21 1,295,118 331 271,000 352 1,566,118
Source: Bappeda and BPS (2000) in From New order to Regional Autonomy Shifting Dynamics
of “Illegal” Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia
From the table above we see that in the year 2000 the total illegal logging camps 331
units found in Berau (180 unit), Malinau (31 unit), Pasir (114 unit). These illegal logging camps
estimated to have production around 271,000 m3/year in 2000 or close to quarter of official
production around 1,3 million  m3/year. Because of the district government loose their revenue
because of the illegal logging, than the government trying to document and acknowledge its
existence. Until recently, provincial and district office only kept production and export statistics
on legal logging activities.
In March 2000, the provincial forest department reported that there was six legally
recognized mills producing plywood, 315 sawmills producing sawn timber and 22 mills
producing moulding in central Kalimantan. These mills consumed a total of around 1.5 million
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m3 of timber between January 2000 (forestry department on; From New order to Regional
Autonomy Shifting Dynamics of “Illegal” Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia). Most of the
sawmills could be found in Kotawaringin Timur, Kotawaringin Barat, and Kapuas. These mills
were thought to have consumed at least 155,750 m3 of timber between January 1999 and January
2000This is approximately 11% of the total timber volume consumed by official sawmills
operating in Central Kalimantan berween January 1999 and January 2000, look at table 3 (From
New order to Regional Autonomy Shifting Dynamics of “Illegal” Logging in Kalimantan,
Indonesia).
Table 3. Estimated “legal” and “illegal” timber production in Central Kalimantan, 2000
industry
production official, legal production
Illegal production Estimated real production
capacity
(M3/year)
Total
unit
official
production
(m3/year) Totalunit
illegal
production
(m3/year)
Total
unit
Production
(m3/year)
Sawmill 1,660,706 315 757,569 190 155,750 505 913,319
Plywood 495,000 6 628,325 n.a n.a 6 628,325
Moulding 276,070 22 92,851 n.a n.a 22 92,851
Total 2,431,776 343 1,478,745 n.a 155,750 533 1,634,495
Source: Bappeda and BPS (2000) in From New order to Regional Autonomy Shifting Dynamics
of “Illegal” Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia
THE SIMILAR STUDY
Research done by Christopher Barr and his partners in Malinau Districts, East
Kalimantan also found that after decentralization the forest area decrease. This research doing by
made some interview with the government official, logging companies, and also the community.
The research found that one of the causes the reducing of the forest area is the concessions given
by the district government. They write the rule pretty good, but very bad in implementation. The
policies they made is overlapping between the policies from the central government, and
between district government. Many logging company feel confused which rule that they have to
follow. The result is many logging company exploit more that it has to be.
They also found that the in Malinau district illegal logging also supported by government
official, police and military. They take the log to outside the country, such as Malaysia and
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Singapore. Illegal logging not only caused the degradation of the forest but also the decrease to
the revenue. Policies and regulation made by the district government still weak that cannot
prevent the forest from illegal logging.
THE FINDING OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
As we already mentioned above, that decentralization as the government policy tried to
transferring considerable degree of administrative and regulatory authority from the national
government to the country’s province and district government. The issue of decentralization
driven by the district government who never felt got some benefit from their resources.
Decentralization give rights to the local and district government to manage their resources and
take benefit from it.
Decentralization in Indonesia started since late 1998. Decentralization on the
administrative followed by decentralization of forest administration. Kalimantan is a very good
example for the decentralization implementation at the forest administration. Kalimantan as we
know is the province in Indonesia which very rich of forest. Kalimantan produced a very large
amount of log. Japan is the biggest importer log from Kalimantan. The exploitation of the forest
increased in line with the increasing of the timber industry.
The implementation of decentralization in Indonesia has to face the limited capability of
the institutional, from the district government, especially the capability to monitor the
implementation of the regulatory that conducted in the forest. Without monitoring systems will
cause the forest become over exploitation. Monitoring system need the institutional
responsibility, without it what will happened is corruption practice. Monitoring systems need a
very high cost to implement it. That’s the problem in Indonesia, the government has not enough
money to implement monitoring system. The result is corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
From the economic point of view, to implement some regulatory means a high cost.
Environmental regulations may not only increase the cost per unit but perhaps more important
they increase fixed costs (those costs that do not vary with how much you produce). When fixed
costs increase substantially, it requires that a firm have a larger output level to maintain
profitability. Thus large costs can lead to market structures with fewer, larger firms (increased
market concentration). Firms gain larger market shares because each is compelled to expand
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production capacity in order to cover these additional fixed costs. Unless demand for the goods
these firms produce somehow changes, firms will merge reducing the number of competitors and
reducing the degree of rivalry
CONCLUSION
Decentralization process in Indonesia which started since late 1998 has to meet the
complexity problems. Illegal logging that already occurred in Indonesia since many years ago,
wt the decentralization era, the amount of the illegal logging increasing. This is happened
because of the decentralization has been done with the limited capability of the institution of
district government.
Illegal logging happened because of the regulatory that is implemented to the forest has
no clear enough to mentioned the rules to exploit the forest. Not only that, but the regulatory is
overlapping between regulatory made by the central government and the district government.
The complicated bureaucracy made many logging company take the short way that will give
much profit to them. But in the reality not only logging company which doing some illegal
practice, but the local people also doing that. The reasons of the local people do the illegal way,
because of the economic reason, that they want to have a better live. The regulatory have the
weakness side that it I not considered about the equity.
Illegal logging gives a very bad impact not only to the environment, but also to the
economic side. We know that Indonesia as the third largest forest in the world, most of the
people live depend on the forest and forest product. Illegal logging practice will reduce the
revenue of the district government and local people.
Regulatory to the environment take a high cost. It means that with the implementation of
the regulatory will increase the production costs. But the most important is regulatory will
increase the fixed cost. This needs to be considered in implementing some regulatory. Because
without considering about the costs, the impact is the illegal practice will be done, and also the
corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
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